This research studies buyout sponsors' incentive and corporate control in Reverse Leveraged Buyouts (RLBOs). By and large, buyout sponsors take LBOs public when LBO structure has achieved the most improvement. Contrary to previous literature, RLBO firms do not experience significant operating performance deterioration after going public. In this study, I empirically measure sponsor incentive using LBO relative size to buyout sponsor capital as a proxy. Buyout sponsors with weaker incentives are more likely to quick flip a deal; quick flip leads to poorer subsequent performance. Generally, buyout sponsors' decisions to take LBOs public are consistent with a partial equilibrium. I find a negative relationship between the buyout sponsors' ownership before IPO and the firms' long-term value after IPO. Buyout sponsors maximize benefits of control through staged exit strategy. For example, they are more likely to continue to hold equity in cash-rich firms while sell their stakes through subsequent takeovers in firms with higher ownership concentration. Overall, this paper helps us to understand buyout sponsors' organizational role in RLBOs. 
Introduction
The recent Initial Public Offering (IPO) market has witnessed a wave of the so- RLBOs is clearly not the same as your average "Joe" or diffuse public shareholder.
Buyout sponsors seem to enjoy a significant advantage over diffuse shareholders regarding the importance of their role in influencing management decisions and corporate control.
This is the first study to systematically examine the organizational roles of buyout sponsors in RLBOs, particularly their decision of quick flip, taking LBOs public and cashing out ex post. In this study I find it often takes buyout sponsors several years to sell their shares -if they do so at all. On average, buyout sponsors sell less than 10% of shares in IPOs, which implies they sit on big paper gains in RLBO firms. Consequently, buyout sponsors have incentives to make sure their interest is not at risk if the market tumbles or firm profitability deteriorates. If corporate control in RLBOs strictly benefits sponsors, potential conflicts of interest between buyout sponsors and diffuse shareholders could arise.
In this research, corporate decisions made by buyout sponsors such as quick flip, going public and takeovers will be endogenized in the context of incentive and corporate control. Two theories are relevant in explaining why buyout sponsors take LBOs public.
The behavioral theory of Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) outlines the IPO performancetiming hypothesis. It essentially states the decision for LBOs to go public is driven by buyout sponsors' opportunistic behaviors. They empirically find RLBO firms exhibit deterioration in operating performance following IPOs, which they attribute to insider manipulation or propitious IPO timing. I herein will reexamine the IPO performancetiming hypothesis using a much larger and more comprehensive sample of RLBOs in the hope of reflecting the market changes in the private equity industry and the LBO market.
More generally, I propose a new measure to proxy buyout sponsor's incentives in RLBO relative size of LBO (book asset value before IPO) to buyout sponsor's size (total capital raised since inception). The logic is buyout sponsors will have more economic and reputation stake in LBO firms with relatively more assets. Therefore, buyout sponsors are more likely to allocate more resources in monitoring and improving relatively larger LBOs, ceretus paribus.
In contrast to Degeorge and Zeckhauser's performance timing hypothesis, I
develop and test two hypotheses from the rational IPO theory proposed by Zingales (1995) . Zingales argues that the decision to go public is an equilibrium decision, hence a "value-maximizing strategy" made by incumbent owners who eventually want to sell their stake. In the context of RLBOs, buyout sponsors seek two possible benefits: the increase in cash flow and the increase in private benefits of control. The main implication of his model is incumbent owners (buyout sponsors) will optimize their ownership structure through IPOs (equity optimization) and adopt a staged exit strategy by selling cash flow and control rights sequentially to maximize total control benefits (staged exit).
Buyout sponsors take LBOs public when the value added from ownership concentration ceases to outweigh monitoring cost. Under the equity optimization hypothesis, buyout sponsors take LBOs public as an equilibrium choice. The equilibrium indicates a negative relationship between firm value and buyout sponsors' ownership ex ante and a nonnegative relationship between firm value and ownership ex post. The staged exit hypothesis states buyout sponsors are more likely to exit if firms have less cash flow, and they are more likely to sell their stakes through subsequent takeovers if firms have more concentrated ownership ex ante.
The empirical analysis helps us to better understand buyout sponsors' rationale in taking LBOs public and their subsequent role in RLBOs. Our study is related to Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) , which views stock market listings as an exit opportunity for professional pre-IPO investors such as buyout sponsors. Brau et al. (2003) examine the choice between going public and selling the firm to a publicly traded buyer. They find private firms are more likely to choose the IPO route over a takeover when their size is larger and the industry market-to-book ratio is lower. Contrastingly, this paper will focus exclusively on LBO firms that go public. The public market hence provides buyout sponsors an option for subsequent takeovers to cash out. One purpose of this research is to understand buyout sponsors' role in corporate governance and control of RLBO firms.
Due to the limited availability of data on private LBOs, I will infer the rationale and incentives of buyout sponsors to take LBOs public by examining the ex ante characteristics of the firms that go public and from the ex post investment and financial consequences of this decision.
First, I examine organizational structures of RLBO firms and how they change both in the short run, during the IPO, and in the long run, after going public. I look into the dynamics of operating performance, governance and ownership structure to deduce why LBOs go public. The examination of corporate governance structure such as board composition and sponsors' ownership reveals whether publicly owned RLBO firms are very different from LBO forms 3 , and whether buyout sponsors continue to be active investors in publicly owned RLBOs.
Second, I examine the sponsors' decision to quick flip a firm. I relate such quick flipping decision to exogenous or pre-determined variables such as the relative size of a LBO firm to its buyout sponsors' total historical capital (total capital raised since inception). Quick flip might be driven by IPO market condition as well. In hot market, sponsors will find it easier to turn a LBO investment into quick cash with a reasonable return. Furthermore, for buyout sponsors, the incentives in LBOs vary cross-sectionally according to projected economic gains and reputation stake. Larger LBOs will realize greater returns per unit of monitoring effort (time of traveling or attending board meeting), ceretus paribus. Such scale effect of monitoring induces buyout sponsors to exert disproportionally more effort in larger LBO deals. I empirically proxy their effort level with a dummy for quick flip. The faster to flip a deal, the less effort is exerted.
Third, I empirically examine the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in RLBOs. In the equilibrium, buyout sponsors should adjust ownership structure in the IPO only if the benefit of such adjustment outweighs the cost of maintaining the existing ownership structure. RLBOs, in effect, serve as a mechanism to optimize buyout sponsor ownership structure. Empirically, we will test a non-negative relationship between firm value and buyout sponsor's ownership post IPO and a negative relationship between firm value and ownership before IPO.
Finally, I endogenize buyout sponsors' cashing out choices from RLBO firms.
More than one-third of RLBOs are acquired after trading as public firms, suggesting that the subsequent sale of control rights is critical for buyout sponsors. I therefore relate posterior sale of control rights and exit decision to cash flow measures and ownership structure. I test the prediction that buyout sponsors will be less likely to exit from firms with more cash flow, while they are more likely to sell control rights in firms with larger ownership through posterior takeovers.
The following are the key findings of the paper: • LBOs go public when sales growth peaks at the year of IPO; there is no operating performance deterioration following IPO.
• Buyout sponsors continue to be active investors after IPOs: they hold large ownership in RLBOs post-IPO, and they retain significant control of board and board committees.
• Quick flip is negatively associated with the relative size of RLBOs to buyout sponsors; quick flip leads to poorer long-term performance.
• Buyout sponsors hold more equity in RLBOs with larger relative size; sponsor's ownership before IPO is negatively associated with Tobin's Q; ownership post IPO has no value impact.
• Buyout sponsors play active roles selectively: they are more likely to quickly exit if firms have less cash flow; they induce more subsequent takeovers if the firms' ownership is highly concentrated.
The organization of the paper is as follows: section 2 provides literature review and background, section 3 discusses the methodology, section 4 summarizes the data and sample statistics, section 5 describes the result of the certification role of buyout sponsors in IPOs, section 6 presents the main analysis of the role of buyout sponsors in RLBO firms post-IPO, and the final section concludes the paper.
Literature Review and Background
This research is related to literature about the choices of going public with large insider ownership. Zingales (1995) is the most closely related paper since it theoretically models how the decision to go public will be affected by considerations of corporate control. Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) propose that LBOs going public is more likely to be driven by opportunistic behaviors of insiders who try to time performance. In the context of VC-backed IPOs, Black and Gilson (1998) consider going public as an exit opportunity for venture capitalists and a mechanism for entrepreneurs to reacquire control from the venture capitalists. This paper is also related to research that studies source of performance improvement in RLBOs. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) find that going private transactions and the resulting increase in ownership concentration or improvement in governance structure is the source of value in LBOs. Holthausen and Larcker (1996) find RLBO firms have better accounting performance post-IPO than the industry and these firms' accounting performance decreases as ownership concentration of management and other insiders declines. One concern with these early works on RLBOs is they often use a small sample from the 1980s, when the buyout market was in its rudimentary stage. Cao and Lerner (2007) is a recent effort that attempts to adopt a more systematic examination on RLBO firms' stock performance.
There is a comprehensive work on large equity ownership concentration and firm performance and value. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) More generally, the scrutiny of RLBOs stems from the potentially deleterious moral hazard problems that can result when buyout sponsors push problematic firms public with certain "inside knowledge." One concern is "problematic" firms are flipped public before these hidden "problems" unfold, transferring the expected bankruptcy risk and loss to public investors. In addition to quick flips, I examine such perverse incentive 
Methodology

Empirical Measures
To empirically proxy the buyout sponsor's incentives in the RLBO firms, I define the relative asset, which is ratio of LBO book asset to buyout sponsor's total historical (raised since its inception) capital.
The relative size works as a predetermined variable to measure the potential economic importance and reputation stake of a given LBO firm to buyout sponsors. For a given buyout sponsor, relatively smaller LBO firms contribute less to his total eventual profit, ceretus paribus. Monitoring usually entails attending board meetings and working with management on a regular basis. As such, buyout sponsors make tradeoffs between scale of return and time input in a given LBO deal. Buyout sponsors, therefore, have less incentive to monitor relatively smaller firms 5 .
One concern with the relative size as a proxy for incentive is whether the variable is endogenous. Buyout sponsors might make decisions regarding time or efforts to right at structuring LBO deals. The problem of using LBO deal size is the lack of sufficient data. Another disadvantage is that buyout sponsors typically engage asset sale in restructuring LBOs. I therefore use firm size prior to IPO. The empirical investigation is to understand what affects buyout sponsors' monitoring (measured by ownership) and efforts (measured by a dummy for quick flip).
Tobin's Q is used as a proxy for firms' value, as suggested by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) . It is defined as the ratio of the market value 6 of assets divided by the book value of assets. I use sales growth to measure firms' growth. To measure a firm's operating performance, I use net income/assets or EBIDTA/sales, both used in the previous literature.
Regression Specifications of Quick Flips
I investigate the effects of quick flipping on firms' subsequent performance using Heckman Heckman's selection regressions. Estimates are based on the following twostep estimation procedures:
In the first-step probit regression, the dependent variable is Quick Flip dummy. The identifying instrument is the relative size of LBO firms to their buyout sponsors' capital.
This instrument will capture the economic significance and reputation consideration as buyout sponsors consider a quick flip. For instance, buyout sponsors are more likely to quick flip a firm if it has a relatively smaller size. In the second-step regression, I include Lambda, the inverse Mills Ratio imputed from the Probit estimates as an additional control variable. The dependent variables are net income/assets and bankruptcy dummy.
Regression Specification of Performance and Ownership Relation
To examine the role of buyout sponsors in RLBO firms, I use cross-sectional regressions of long-run firm performance on buyout sponsors' ownership level after IPO.
The performances are the averages of the following years: IPO+1, IPO+2 and IPO+3.
The regressions are specified as
If the buyout sponsors' ownership after IPO is optimal, as the model predicts, I should expect α 1 =0 in the regressions with Tobin's Q. Monitoring of buyout sponsor suggests a significant positive relation between ownership of buyout sponsors and EBIT/sales.
Buyout sponsors' ownership after IPO is an endogenous choice since they can adjust it at IPO by selling secondary shares or buying more shares. I will therefore use ownership level before IPO which is less subject to the endogeneity problem. One concern with ownership before IPO is that buyout sponsors structure LBO transactions because they have certain "knowledge" of firms' prospects. There may be omitted variables correlated with firms' future performance and buyout sponsors' ownership level. In order to address this endogenous problem, I use the instrumental variable approaches with 2 SLS regressions. In the first stage of Tobit regression, sponsors' ownership before IPO (always less than or equal to 1) is regressed on a set of predetermined instruments:
The identifying instrument is the relative size (RLBO firm's assets before IPO to sponsors' total capital raised). If buyout sponsors' ownership is instrumented on the relative size of a portfolio firm to its sponsor's capital, the predicted ownership would be uncorrelated with private information of buyout sponsors from RLBO firms' perspective.
This approach will help mitigate the endogenous bias. The null hypothesis of ownership optimization suggests a negative relation between buyout sponsors' ownership before IPO and Tobin's Q, α 1 <0.
I furthermore examine the relationship between sponsors' ownership post-IPO and subsequent year performance using panel regressions with fixed effects. The regression is specified as:
.
I control leverage, governance, and firm size in the regressions. The regressions with ownership of buyout sponsors in IPO do not take into account that buyout sponsors can sell their ownership after lock-up period. Furthermore, the cross-sectional regressions assume homogeneity across all RLBO firms and ignore the unobserved heterogeneity in RLBO firms. This could result in the biased estimates of the covariance matrix of errors.
Both problems will be controlled in the panel regressions (3) with fixed firm effects.
Regression Specification of Posterior Exit
Buyout sponsors are active investors. Their presence will help monitor and discipline management by resolving the free-rider problem and facilitating takeovers.
More generally, buyout sponsors make tradeoffs between cash flow rights and control benefits. This suggests that they will endogenize their exit choice between liquidation of
shares in the open market and facilitation of takeovers. I will use Probit regressions to investigate both decisions. The Probit regressions for takeovers are specified as:
Φ is a cumulative probability function for normal distribution. Table 2 summarizes the dynamics of performance and debt in RLBO firms at each year from IPO-2 to IPO+2. The purpose of this examination is to understand the rationale for buyout sponsors to bring LBOs public. The operating performances of RLBO firms do not exhibit consistent patterns of change: net ROA (net income/assets) gradually increases and peaks at IPO+1. Sales growth reaches its peak of about 55% at year of the IPO, and it gradually deteriorates afterwards. Operating performances such as EBIT/sales or operating income before depreciation/assets remain stable around IPOs.
Sample Summary
Dynamics of Performance and Leverage in RLBO Firms
The overall pattern suggests buyout sponsors time IPO and they bring LBOs public when the firms are growing the most rapidly. This evidence indicates that buyout sponsors bring portfolio firms public when LBO restructure achieves the most efficiency.
Next, the leverage and debt dynamics show improvement of financial conditions.
Leverage ratio (total debt/assets) peaks at one year before IPO. Net long-term debt issue/asset has a large negative value at the year of IPO, while it is positive in other years.
This suggests that LBOs issue debt before IPO, pay down a large portion of debt at IPO, and they continue issuing debt after IPO. During this process, debt structure also improves. The percentage of subordinated debt in long-term debt decreases from IPO-1 to IPO, and it continues to decrease after IPO. Similarly, the ratio of convertible debt and preferred stock/long-term debt decreases substantially after IPO. These decreases suggest that a large portion of subordinated debt is paid down following IPO and that a large portion of equity-linked debt is either converted into common stock or retired. The percentage of maturing debt in long-term debt shows an increasing pattern after IPO: debt maturing in 2 years/long-term debt increases from 8% at IPO-2 to 16.25% at IPO. The results are similar for debt of other maturing years. This evidence supports a possibility of debt timing. In anticipation of a large portion of debt approaching maturity, RLBO firms go public to improve financial flexibility.
Benchmark-adjusted Performance of RLBO Firms
I compare performance of RLBO firms with three benchmarks: industry-matched new firms (less than 3 years after IPO), industry-matched mature firms (more than 3 years after IPO), and year-matched LBOs (to be acquired within 3 years). For each firm, I
first match it using the industry average of new or mature firms as well as year average of LBOs. I report both the mean and median of averages across the following three years:
IPO, IPO+1 and IPO+2. The results are presented in Table 3 .
RLBO firms are larger in size, more leveraged and have better operating performance. RLBO firms have similar Q and market-to-book ratios compared to new firms in the same industry. Compared to mature firms or LBOs, however, they have higher Q, market-to-book ratios of equity and sales growth. RLBO firms spend more on external investment: their acquisition per unit of sale is significantly higher than three benchmarks, and internally buyout sponsors spend more on CAPEX per unit of sale than mature industry firms or LBOs. Overall, the results suggest that RLBO firms on average are more effective in terms of operating efficiency than other benchmarks. This efficiency can be explained by RLBO and LBO firms' similar organizational structure in terms of monitoring of buyout sponsors, use of debt and improved incentives of insiders. 
Ownership Structure Around IPOs
Ownership and Governance post IPO
Empirical Results of Buyout Sponsors' Role in RLBOs
Decisions of Quick Flip
Cao and Lerner (2007) Table 6 .
Firms with smaller relative size to buyout sponsors are more likely to be quickflipped. This is consistent with incentive structure, that is, buyout sponsors are more likely to flip firms that are of less economic importance. There is weak evidence that aggregate IPO activity also explains quick flipping behaviors: buyout sponsors in a "hot" issue period 9 are more likely to quick flip. In the second stage, the dummy of quick flip has a negative and significant coefficient, revealing that quick flipped firms are more likely to have poor operating performance and subsequently go bankrupt. 
Cross-sectional Regression of Performance on Buyout Sponsor's Ownership
Instrumental Variable Regression of Performance on Buyout Sponsor's Ownership
One concern with the previous estimates in Table 7 is the endogeneity problem.
The reverse causality simply says that buyout sponsors hold less equity ownership in growth firms. Since buyout sponsors' ownership after IPO is a discretional choice, there may be omitted variables correlated with a firm's future performance and buyout sponsors' ownership. For instance, firms hold less equity by buyout sponsors because they know these are relatively "less promising" ones than others. I therefore proceed in Table 8 .
Buyout sponsors' ownership prior to IPO is significantly related to Tobin's Q in a negative way. The negative effects are larger in magnitude after I control the endogeneity problem using instrumental regressions. The coefficient is -1.09 in OLS and -4.58 in 2SLS, both significant at a 1% level. The result suggests that larger prior ownership of buyout sponsors is associated with value reduction of RLBO firms. One possible explanation is buyout sponsors' ownership concentration in original LBO structure becomes inefficient. As a consequence, it becomes an optimal strategy for buyout sponsors to break explicit contracts 10 with LBOs by taking them public.
Panel Regression of Performance on Buyout Sponsor's Ownership controlling RLBO firm's fixed effects
The previous results are subject to the potential bias of unobserved heterogeneity for each RLBO firm. To control such bias, I adopt panel regression approaches by using performance of RLBOs in post-IPO years. Table 9 Additionally, debt has disciplining effects in that it increases EBIT/sales. The evidence that large ownership of buyout sponsors post IPO leads to low sales growth are consistent with the previous regression results.
Buyout Sponsor's Posterior Cashing Out
Buyout sponsors sell a very small fraction of equity ownership in IPOs using secondary shares. As the previous results suggest, they continue to keep a significant equity ownership in post-IPO RLBO firms. For example, Table 1 reports that more than one third of RLBO firms are acquired after they are brought public by buyout sponsors. The overall evidence in Table 10 is consistent with the stage exit hypothesis. 
Conclusion
This study offers a systematic examination of buyout sponsors' organizational role in RLBOs. The paper is also the first one to explicitly examine incentives and controls of buyout sponsors in RLBOs regarding IPO decisions and corporate control.
The empirical evidence suggests buyout sponsors continue to be active investors in publicly-owned RLBO firms because they maintain large equity stakes in the long run after IPOs and they actively monitor the management of RLBOs.
I propose an empirical measure, the relative size of LBOs to buyout sponsor's capital as a proxy for buyout sponsors' incentive in a given RLBO firm. Consistent with incentive structure, I find buyout sponsors hold more ownership in RLBO firms that are relatively larger in size. More specifically, buyout sponsors are more likely to quick flip when their incentive is weaker. Consequently, quick flip leads to poorer operating performance and greater probability of bankruptcy.
The decisions of IPOs are consistent with the rational theory of IPOs. I find LBO companies that initiate IPO reach their peak of sales growth at the year of IPO. I also find RLBO firms reach their peak of leverage one year prior to IPO. In particular, a large portion of debt approaches maturity following IPOs, which indicates RLBOs work as a mechanism to improve financial flexibility ex ante. Overall, the evidence suggests buyout sponsors decide to take their LBO portfolio firms public when LBO restructure has achieved the most improvement. Furthermore, LBOs go public when cost of concentrated ownership of buyout sponsors outweighs its benefit. I find that buyout sponsors' ownership pre-IPO is negatively and significantly related to firm value (proxy by Tobin's Q) in the long run. The results are robust when I control endogenous bias of buyout investment levels. Consistent with the literature, cost of ownership concentration is much higher for firms with more growth opportunities.
Buyout sponsors' ex post cashing out is consistent with a motive for maximum benefits. Buyout sponsors are more likely to continue to hold equity in RLBO firms with more cash. At the same time, buyout sponsors are more likely to facilitate subsequent takeovers in firms with highly concentrated ownership. Buyout sponsors help to overcome the free-rider problem, though they do so only in a discreet manner. Column (2) presents the OLS regression results in the second step with firm subsequent ROA as dependent variable; Column (3) presents the Probit regression results in the second step with subsequent Bankruptcy dummy as dependent variable. ROA (net income/asset) is the average of the following three years: IPO, IPO+1 and IPO+2, measured at the end of year and adjusted by industry median. Bankruptcy dummy is set to 1 if firm file Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 within 5 years of IPO. Lambda is the inverse Mills Ratio. The heteroscedastic robust t-test is reported in the parenthesis. The *, ** and *** indicates the 10%, 5% and 1% significant level. 
Columns (1) and (2) (4) and (5) present the regression results in the second step: firm subsequent performance of EBIT/Sales, sales growth and Tobin's Q on buyout sponsor's prior ownership. ROA, sale growth and Q are the averages of the following three years: IPO+1, IPO+2 and IPO+3, measured at the end of year and adjusted by industry median. The heteroscedastic robust t-test is reported in the parenthesis. The *, ** and *** indicates the 10%, 5% and 1% significant level. Firms go delisting Others
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